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1 Introduction
Internet advertisements that are displayed along with the search results for a key-
word or a combination of keywords are sold through keyword auctions. The gener-
alized second price auction (GSP) is the most widely used auction mechanism for
selling advertisements on Internet search engines. Each time a user enters a search
keyword into a search engine, a GSP-type auction allocates the advertising slots
within that user’s search results. The Internet advertisement revenue via keyword
auctions has increased constantly in the last few years and is a principal source of
revenue of search engines.1
The advertisements related to a searched keyword are usually displayed on the
right-hand side of the search result pages. The number of the ads on each search
result page is limited to less than or equal to a fixed number, and this holds true
for major search engines such as Google and Yahoo!.2 This seems to be a puzzle
because a search engine can add a new advertising slot with no cost burden and
the new advertisement creates an additional advertising revenue. A naive answer
for the limit of the number of the advertisements is that it servers the interests of
search engine users; too many advertisements on a search result page reduces the
users’ benefit and the search engine loses endorsement from them.
In this study, we explain why a search engine restricts the number of the adver-
tisements from the perspective of the search engine’s slot supply strategy. There
are no existing studies investigating the reason for the limited number of advertis-
1For example, Google’s revenue from these auctions increased more than 2.5-fold from $6
billion in 2005 to $16.4 billion in 2007. Since 2003, the revenue generated from keyword
auctions has accounted for approximately 47% of the total Internet advertisement revenue in
the U.S., which increased from $2.7 billion in 2003 to $7.2 billion in 2009 (from annual re-
ports by the Interactive Advertising Bureau (http://www.iab.net/insights research/
947883/adrevenuereport).
2Interestingly, even if you, as a user of Google search or Yahoo! search, change the setting on
the number of search results on each page, this ceiling of the number of advertisements on a page
remains unchanged.
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ing slots on a search result page. We show that limiting the number of advertising
slots is a simple but powerful method of increasing the search engine’s revenue.
Many studies that consider how a search engine sells advertising slots follow
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) on the optimal design of an auc-
tion mechanism for a single object. Iyengar and Kumar (2006a,b) use a direct
mechanism for a keyword auction and considers the computation problem of the
optimal allocation of advertising slots. Assuming the separable click through-rates
(CTRs), Edelman and Schwarz (2010) analyze the optimal reserve price and show
that the GSP with the optimal reserve price is the optimal auction. In Ostrovsky
and Schwarz (2009), the impact of the reserve price is measured in a field exper-
iment on the actual keyword auction conduced by Yahoo!. Although in reality,
the auctioneer does not have the exact information on the distributions of the bid-
ders’ values and cannot set the optimal reserve price, these results suggest that a
reserve price is an effective method of increasing the seller’s revenue. In contrast,
in this study, we explore another method, limiting the number of advertising slots,
to improve the revenue.
Our analysis adopts a simplified model of keyword auctions. We assume that
each advertiser knows his value (expected revenue) per click. The CTR of an
advertising slot depends only on its position, and we assume that the CTRs of
advertising slots are common knowledge. All advertisers maximize expected profit
(defined as total value of clicks received minus total payment in the auction). We
describe a keyword auction as a one-shot incomplete information game where each
advertiser simultaneously announces his bid to a search engine.
From the game theoretic analysis, we obtain an explicit representation of a
search engine’s revenue. Then, we show that for a given keyword, there exists an
optimal number of advertising slots that maximizes the search engine’s expected
revenue and this optimal number is independent of the values of CTRs of all ad-
vertising slots. This result is obtained from a suggestive theorem of decreasing
marginal return across slots, i.e., the marginal return on CTR at a higher advertis-
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ing slot is greater than that at a lower advertising slot.
The decreasing marginal return across slots gives us a useful insight to under-
stand a slot supply strategy of a search engine. It implies that a search engine can
increase its revenue by ramping the CTRs across slots. In other words, to increase
the expected revenue, the search engine designs the placement of the advertise-
ments in a manner that the advertisements in higher positions receive several clicks
and the advertisements in lower positions receive few. This insight seems to be
consistent with the current form of keyword auctions where a few advertisements
in the top positions are highlighted and the advertisements in lower positions are
displayed only in the second or third page of search results.
We also analyze a more general question of how a seller of divisible goods
such as land, forest and water, divides the goods into a finite number of items with
different sizes when the items are sold through position auctions. We show that
our result from the analysis of keyword auctions can be applied to this general
framework, and the optimal number defined in a keyword auction becomes the
upper-bound of the optimal number of items in this context.
Finally, we analyze the comparative statics on the optimal number of adver-
tising slots in keyword auction. We provide a sufficient condition for the optimal
number of slots for a certain keyword being greater than or equal to that for another
keyword. We also show that the optimal number of slots is non-decreasing as the
number of potential advertisers increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain
the basic setup of our model and provide the result on the seller’s expected revenue.
In Section 3, we propose the slot supply strategy of a search engine, and show that
a restriction on the number of advertising slots on a page and an accentuation of the
advertisement in the higher position are effective methods of increasing the seller’s
revenue. We also apply our result to the more general question of how a seller
of divisible goods divides the goods into a finite number of items in Section 4.
In Section 5, we conduct a comparative statics analysis on the optimal number of
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slots. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Basic setup
A keyword auction is defined by the following components. There are n,n = 2,
advertisers (bidders) participating in a keyword auction and each advertiser i has a
value or expected revenue vi for a click on the advertisement. There are K advertis-
ing slots with click-through rates (CTRs) α1,α2, ...,αK , where αk is the estimated
probability of being clicked or the estimated number of clicks per given period, for
an advertiser in the k-th advertising slot (the slot k). We assume α1 = α2 = ...= αK
and set αk = 0 for all k > K for notational convenience. We assume n= K.3 Each
advertiser submits a bid to the auction. The bid submitted by i is denoted by bi. We
denote the bid profile of n advertisers by b = (b1, . . . ,bn).
In the generalized second price auction (GSP), advertisers are allocated adver-
tising slots in the descending order of the bids b1,b2, ...,bn. Let d(k) denote the
name of the bidder who submits k-th highest bid among b. In the GSP, bidder d(k)
acquires the slot k. The advertiser obtaining the slot k pays the bid of the advertiser
obtaining one lower advertising slot (the slot k+1) for each click. Hence, the pay-
ment pGk (b) is αkbd(k+1). To complete the definition of the payments, we assume
that bd(k) = 0 if k > n. From this, when K = n, the payments of d(K) is assumed
to be zero, and for k > K, bidder d(k) pays αkbd(k+1) = 0 by the definition of αk.
The payoff of bidder d(k) is given by αkvd(k)−αkbd(k+1).
2.2 Revenue of a search engine
We model a keyword auction in the GSP as a normal form game of incomplete
information. Thus, we assume that vi, the valuation of i to obtain the advertising
slot, is private information.
3In reality, this is not a restriction because when n < K, it is sufficient to redefine K by K = n.
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Let Fi : [0, v¯)→ [0,1] be a distribution function of the valuation of bidder i and
fi(vi) ≡ F ′i (vi) is its density function. We assume that the value of each bidder is
independent and identically distributed and thus Fi(·) = F(·) and fi(·) = f (·) for all
i. We call {v ∈ [0, v¯)|0 < F(v)< 1} the effective domain of F . We further assume
that F is increasing in its effective domain. This implies that F−1(u) is well defined
and increasing for u ∈ (0,1).We define F−1(0) by limu→0+F−1(u) and F−1(1) by
limu→1−F−1(u).
To analyze the equilibrium behavior of the bidders in the keyword auction, we
focus on the symmetric equilibrium where every bidder follows the same strategy
that determines the bid depending on his true valuation. Let β : [0, v¯)→ R+ be
such a strategy and β (v) be the bid of the advertiser whose value is v. We assume
that β (·) is increasing and differentiable and β (0) = 0.
Given a bidding profile b= (b1, ...,bn), the revenue of the auctioneer is defined
by
m(b) =
K
∑
k=1
αkbd(k+1).
For any vector of values, v = (v1, . . . ,vn), let β (v) = (β (v1), ...,β (vn)).
Let Vi denote a random variable of bidder i’s valuation and V = (V1, ...,Vn) be
a random vector. Note that β (V) is also a random vector. The expected revenue of
the auctioneer is
E[m(β (V))],
where E[·] is a expectation operator with respect to a distribution function F .
In this section, we explore the explicit representation of the expected revenue
in order to analyze the revenue maximizing behavior of the auctioneer. To find
the explicit formula of the expected revenue, we rely on the revenue equivalence
theorem (see, for example, Lahaie, Pennock, Saberi, and Vohra 2007). From the
revenue equivalence theorem, we know that the expected revenue in the GSP auc-
tion is the same as the one in the VCG (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973)
mechanism, in which submitting bidder’s true value is his dominant strategy and
thus the symmetric equilibrium is constructed by β (vi) = vi.
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The VCG mechanism uses the following allocation and payments rules. The
allocation rule is the same as the one in the GSP. For the payment rule, advertiser
i = d(k) pays the negative externality that i imposes on other advertisers. The
payment of advertiser i who acquires the slot k is
pVk (b) =
[
k−1
∑
h=1
αhbd(h)+
K
∑
h=k
αhbd(h+1)
]
−
[
k−1
∑
h=1
αhbd(h)+
K
∑
h=k+1
αhbd(h)
]
, (1)
where, assuming that each advertiser submits the bid of its true value for a click,
the expression in the first square bracket is the sum of the revenue of advertisers
other than i when i leaves the auction, and the expression in the second square
bracket is the sum of their revenue when i participates in the auction.
By simple calculation, Eq. (1) is reduced to
pVk (b) =
K+1
∑
h=k+1
(αh−1−αh)bd(h) =
K
∑
h=k
(αh−αh+1)bd(h+1).
From this, we obtain a convenient recursive formula for the payment of advertisers:
pVK(b) =αKbd(K+1), and for each k= 1,2, . . . ,K−1, pVk (b) = (αk−αk+1)bd(k+1)+
pVk+1(b).
For any value vector v= (v1, . . . ,vn), let (v(1), . . . ,v(n)) be the rearrangement of
vi by the non-increasing order, i.e., v(k) ≥ v(h) for any k and h with k≥ h. For nota-
tional convenience, we set v(n+1) = 0. For a given v, the revenue of the auctioneer
in the VCG is
mV (v) =
K
∑
k=1
pVk (v) =
K
∑
k=1
K
∑
h=k
(αh−αh+1)v(h+1) =
K
∑
k=1
k(αk−αk+1)v(k+1) (2)
where note that αK+1 = 0.
Proposition 1. The expected revenue of the auctioneer in the GSP auction with
incomplete information, M, is
K
∑
k=1
k(αk−αk+1)E[V(k+1)]
where V(k+1) is the (k+ 1)-th highest order statistic generated from distribution
function F and we set E[V(n+1)] = 0.
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Proof. From the revenue equivalence theorem and Eq. (2),
M = E[mV (V)] = E[
K
∑
k=1
k(αk−αk+1)V(k+1)] =
K
∑
k=1
k(αk−αk+1)E[V(k+1)].
Thus, the expected revenue of the auctioneer is the weighted average of the
expectation of the (k+1)-th order statistic of advertisers’ valuation when we nor-
malize ∑Kk=1 αk = 1 because ∑Kk=1 k(αk−αk+1) = ∑Kk=1 αk.
When there is only one advertising slot and α1 = 1, the expected revenue is
E[V(2)] and this is similar to the expected revenue in a single-object auction with-
out reserve price (see, for example, Krishna 2002). Thus, this result is a natural
extension to the case of selling multiple items.
The expected revenue of a search engine defined in the proposition is supported
from other frameworks. In a complete information setting, Varian (2007) and Edel-
man et al. (2007) introduce an equilibrium concept, known as a locally envy-free
equilibrium, and show that the revenue defined in Proposition 1 is equal to the ex-
pectation of the revenue predicted from the bidder-optimal locally envy-free equi-
librium.4 In the recent work of Edelman and Schwarz (2010), the bidder-optimal
locally envy-free equilibrium is uniquely justified from the criterion obtained by
considering the upper bound of the revenue of a finitely repeated keyword auction
of incomplete information when the reserve price is optimally selected. Several
works focus on the dynamic aspect of keyword auctions. Cary, Das, Edelman, Gi-
otis, Heimerl, Karlin, Mathieu, and Schwarz (2007) examine the dynamic process
of bidding behavior where, in each period, one bidder changes the bid to the one
that produces the most favorable outcome for the bidder, taking other bidders’ bids
in the previous period as given. They show that this bidding behavior converges
to the bidder-optimal locally envy-free equilibrium. Kamijo (2010) considers the
bidding behavior in an environment where each bidder changes his bid without
4The bidder-optimal locally envy-free equilibrium gives the lowest revenue among the set of all
locally envy-free equilibria.
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realizing others’ current and past bids. Kamijo (2010) shows that the same re-
sult as Cary et al. (2007) holds even in this setting. In a laboratory experiment,
Fukuda, Kamijo, Takeuchi, Masui, and Funaki (2010) found that there is no sta-
tistical difference between the average revenue of a seller in a repeatedly played
keyword auction in the lab and the revenue in the bidder-optimal locally envy-free
equilibrium.
3 Slot supply strategy of a search engine
In this section, we consider how a search engine can increase its revenue by mod-
ifying the placement of advertising slots and the number of the advertising slots
displayed on a search result page.
3.1 Motivating Example
Let us consider a situation where there are five bidders and five advertising slots for
a keyword. The values of the bidders are distributed according to a uniform distri-
bution between 0 and 100. The CTRs are given by (α1, ...,α5)= (100,80,60,40,20).
In the case of uniform distribution, the expectation of the k-th highest order
statistic is given by
E[V(k)] = v¯
n+1− k
n+1
, (3)
where v is distributed between 0 and v¯ and the number of the bidders is n. From
Proposition 1 and the above equation, we calculate the expected revenue of the
auctioneer and obtain M ∼= 6667.
Next, let us consider a situation where the CTRs of advertising slots diminish.
This is not a difficult task for the search engine because it determines the place
where the advertisements will appear or the number of the advertisements on the
first search result page. For example, we consider a situation where α5 becomes 0
(i.e., deleting slot 5). In this new situation, the expected revenue of the auctioneer
becomes M = 8000. This implies that the auctioneer’s revenue is improved by
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reducing CTRs of advertising slots.5
As shown in the example above, the revenue of the auctioneer can be improved
by manipulating the CTRs, especially by reducing the CTRs. This is an easier
method of increasing revenue than manipulating the auction mechanism.
To obtain greater insight on the auctioneer’s slot supply strategy of the auction-
eer, we consider the case where the CTR of one slot is improved by one point. Let
Mk, k = 1,2,3,4,5, denote the expected revenue when the CTR of slot k is slightly
improved and is changed from αk to αk +1. By easy calculation, we have
M1−M ∼= 67,
M2−M ∼= 33,
M3−M = 0,
M4−M ∼=−33,
M5−M ∼=−67.
From these equations, we find that on one hand, an increase in CTR for slots 1
or 2 enhances the auctioneer’s revenue, and on the other hand, that for slots 4
or 5 decreases the revenue. We also find that Mk −M is decreasing in k with
M1−M > 0 and M5−M < 0. This implies that there exist L such that ML−M = 0
and ML+1−M < 0 (for this example, L= 3). Since the expected revenue is linearly
varied to the change in the CTRs, it is indicated that supplying the top L advertising
slots is the optimal strategy for the search engine.
Why does the revenue decrease even though the CTR of an advertising slot is
improved? This counter-intuitive observation is explained as follows.6 When the
5This result does not rely on our simplified setting that the price of the lowest advertising slot
(slot 5) is zero. Even if there exists a minimal price ε > 0 which the bidder in the last position pays
for each click and ε is sufficiently small, the search engine can increase its revenue by deleting the
slot 5.
6Because we do not obtain the explicit representation of equilibrium strategy for a keyword auc-
tion with incomplete information, the following explanation is based on the equilibrium bid at the
bidder-optimal locally envy-free equilibrium for a keyword auction with complete information. As
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CTR of an advertising slot, for example slot k, is improved, the bidder d(k) who
currently occupies slot k is satisfied with the current slot and thus, loses the incen-
tive to obtain higher advertising slots, thereby decreasing his bid. This decrease
occurs even though bidder d(k+1) increases his bid in order to obtain slot k. The
decrease in the bid of d(k) then motivates the decrease in the bid of d(k−1), and
this induces the further decrease in the bid of d(k−2), and so on. Therefore, while
the search engine’s revenue obtained from slot k increases due to the improvement
of CTR of slot k combined with an increase of bd(k+1) (i.e., the positive direct effect
of the improvement of CTR of slot k), the revenues obtained from higher advertis-
ing slots will decrease (i.e., the negative indirect effect of the improvement of CTR
of slot k). If slot k is in a lower position, the former effect (the positive direct ef-
fect) is dominated by the latter (the negative indirect effect), and thus, the revenue
of the search engine will decrease. On the other hand, if slot k is in a higher posi-
tion, the former effect dominates the latter, and thus, the search engine’s revenue is
improved.
3.2 Optimal slot restriction and accentuating certain slots
In this subsection, we examine the observation made in the previous subsection
by a general framework. To illustrate the results in this subsection, we assume a
situation where the seller initially provides a sufficient number of advertising slots
to the advertisers. Thus, we assume K = n.
We define the marginal return of slot k, denoted by µk, as the derivative of M
by αk. Thus, µk is defined as follows: for k = 1,2, ...,K,
µk ≡ ∂M∂αk =−(k−1)E[V(k)]+ kE[V(k+1)].
From this equation, we find that the marginal expected return of slot k is a constant
and independent of the values of CTRs of advertising slots. If we compare this
with an example in the previous subsection, µk corresponds to Mk−M. Thus, our
aim is to show that µ1,µ2, ...,µK are in the decreasing order.
explained in subsection 2.2, this prediction is consistent with the expected revenue in Proposition 1.
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Next we explain our assumption on distribution function F . We define the
virtual valuation of the bidder whose value is v by φF(v) = v− 1−F(v)f (v) . We say
that F is regular (or F satisfies regularity) if a virtual valuation is increasing in the
effective domain of F .7 The regularity is a weaker condition than the increasing
hazard rate (the hazard rate defined by f (v)1−F(v) is increasing in v). F is weakly
regular (or F satisfies weak regularity) if a virtual valuation is non-decreasing but
not a constant.
The next theorem is a generalization of the observation in the previous subsec-
tion and one of our main results.
Theorem 1 (Decreasing marginal return across slots). Assume that F satisfies reg-
ularity. The following three statements hold:
(i) µ1 > µ2 > ... > µK ,
(ii) µ1 > 0, and
(iii) µK < 0.
The proof is in the appendix. It is not difficult to show that the statements of
this theorem hold for the case where F is weakly regular.
This theorem gives us a useful insight to understand a search engine’s slot-
supply strategy. It implies that a search engine can increase its revenue not by uni-
formly improving CTRs across slots but by ramping the CTRs across advertising
slots. In fact, in the example given in the previous subsection, the expected revenue
of the auctioneer is unchanged even if the CTRs of advertising slots are uniformly
improved and then become (α1, ...,α5) = (100+ a,80+ a,60+ a,40+ a,20+ a)
for any a > 0. On the other hand, if the CTRs of advertising slots are inclined
and become (α1, ...,α5) = (100+a,80+a,60,40−a,20−a) for any a ∈ (0,20),
the expected revenue increases by 200a. Thus, to increase the expected revenue,
the search engine designs the placement of the advertisements in a manner that the
7This assumption is the same as one in Myerson (1981) on the optimal design of auction.
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ads in higher positions receive several clicks and the ads in lower positions receive
fewer clicks.
In the rest of this subsection, we explain the consequences of Theorem 1 for
two types of search engine’s slot supply strategies. One strategy is to restrict the
number of the advertising slots displayed on the search result page. In the real
world, this strategy is executed in a keyword auction.8 The other is accentuating
certain advertising slots to improve their CTRs.
For L 5 K, an L-slot restriction is the slot supply strategy such that a search
engine sells only top L advertising slots. In other words, the search engine set
αk = 0 for any k > L with keeping the CTRs of top L advertising slots unchanged.
From Theorem 1, the optimal slot restriction is obtained.
Proposition 2. Assume that F is regular. Let L∗ satisfy
µL∗ = 0 > µL∗+1.
Then, the L∗-slot restriction maximizes the expected revenue of the seller among
any L-slot restrictions.
Proof. This is clear from Theorem 1.
There are three remarks on this proposition. First, L∗ is determined only by
the distribution function F (correctly speaking, the order statistics of F). Thus,
a change in CTRs of advertising slots does not influence the optimal number L∗.
This enables a search engine to execute the different types of slot supply strategy
separately. Second, even if we consider the slot restriction on the first page, L∗ is
still the optimal number. An L-slot restriction on the first page is the slot supply
strategy such that a search engine makes the CTR of slot k,k > L, rαk, where r ∈
(0,1). Third, in the case of uniform distribution on [0, v¯], µk is directly calculated
8In 2007, the number of ads on a page was restricted to less than or equal to eight (Varian 2007).
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as follows.
µk =−(k−1)E[V(k)]+ kE[V(k+1)]
=−(k−1)v¯ n+1− k
n+1
+ kv¯ n− k
n+1
= v¯
n+1−2k
n+1
.
Thus L∗ is n+12 if n is odd and
n
2 if n is even.
Since irrespective of the values of CTRs, the optimal number L∗ of slots is de-
termined, another search engine’s slot-supply strategy is to improve CTR of certain
advertising slots. Assume that α1 > α2 > ... > αK > 0. For k, a slot k-accentuation
is the slot supply strategy such that the CTR of the slot k is slightly improved and
that of the other slots remains unchanged. Thus, the search engine makes the CTR
of slot k αk +η , where η is a small positive number satisfying αk +η < αk−1 for
any k. The slot k-accentuation is a simplified form of the real world slot supply
strategy, in which search engines highlight specific advertising slots.
Proposition 3. Assume that F is regular. The slot 1-accentuation maximizes the
expected revenue of the auctioneer among any slot k-accentuation.
Proof. From Theorem 1, the marginal return of slot 1 is the highest.
The statement of this proposition can hold in a more general framework. First,
we consider a more realistic setting such that after slot k-accentuation, the CTRs
of the other slots decrease. Thus, while the new CTR of slot k becomes αk +η ,
the new CTR of slot h,h 6= k, is αh − δ , where (K− 1)δ 5 η , δ > 0 and αk +
η < αk−1− δ for any k > 1. Even in this general setting, it is easily shown from
Theorem 1 that the slot 1-accentuation gives the highest revenue.
Second, we consider the situation where a seller can freely select the values of
CTRs of slots with a restriction such that α1 = α2 = ... = αK = 0 and the sum of
the CTRs is a constant number C,C > 0. What is the solution for this allocation
problem? Applying Theorem 1 again, the answer is to set α1 =C and αk = 0 for
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any k > 1. Therefore, if the sum of the CTRs is restricted to a constant value, there
is no reason for the seller to divide them into several slots.
4 Other applications
In this section, we consider a slightly different situation from the keyword auction.
A divisible good that amounts to C, for example, a land, is sold to several producers
(i.e., farmers). The landowner can freely partition the lands into K blocks, and
the sizes of blocks are α1,α2, ...,αK , where α1 = α2 = ... = αK . Farmers have
different technologies and a farmer with technology v, v∈R+, obtains a return vαk
if he uses a land whose size is αk. Assume that technology v is independent and
identically distributed according to F . Now consider what happens if the owner
sells his land by a generalized second price auction. In this context, the utility of
a farmer i who acquires block k is viαk − bd(k+1), where bd(k+1) is defined in a
similar manner as in a keyword auction. The only difference between this model
and a keyword auction is the payment rule. Then, applying the revenue equivalence
theorem, the expected revenue of the landowner is that defined in Proposition 1.
Therefore, Theorem 1 also holds for this model, and thus, from the last paragraph in
the previous subsection, this landowner maximizes his expected revenue by setting
α1 =C and αk = 0 for other k > 1.
The result in the previous paragraph indicates that there is no room for the
landowner to partition the land if he wants to sell it.9 The reason for this unintu-
itive result is that in the model above, there is no benefit from partitioning. Thus,
if we consider the model of diminishing marginal return from land, the result is
completely different. We now consider the same problem of the landowner as
9Wilson (1979) observed a similar result. He compared the revenue when a single item is sold
in a first price auction (unit auction) with the revenue when the share of the item is sold in a share
auction in which each bidder submits a schedule which specifies the number of shares requested for
each possible price per share. Wilson (1979) observed that in some cases, the revenue in the share
auction is only half of that in the unit auction.
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that in the previous paragraph, but we now incorporate the benefit of partition by
modifying the payoff of the farmers. Let s : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying
s(α) > 0,s′(α) > 0 and s′′(α) < 0 for any α > 0 and s(0) = 0. A farmer with
technology v, v ∈ R+, obtains a return vs(αk) if he uses a land whose size is αk.
Let M(α1,α2, ...,αK) be the expected revenue defined in Proposition 1, i.e.,
M(α1,α2, ...,αK) :=
K
∑
k=1
k(αk−αk+1)E[V(k+1)].
Then, the problem of the landowner is to maximize M(s(α1),s(α2), ...,s(αK)) un-
der the condition that α1 = α2 = ...= αK = 0 and ∑Kk=1 αk =C.
This maximization problem can be solved by the Lagrange multiplier method.
We have the following necessity conditions for the optimum:
αk(s′(αk)µk−λ ) = 0 for any k = 1,2, ...,K, (4)
and
s′(αk)µk−λ 5 0 for any k = 1,2, ...,K,
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier and satisfies λ = 0.
Let L∗ be that defined in Proposition 2 and be the optimal number of advertising
slots for a keyword auction. Interestingly, we will show that L∗ is also an important
number in this context. Let k be an integer greater than L∗. By the definition of
L∗, µk < 0 holds. This implies that for any non-negative λ , s′(αk)µk−λ < 0 for
any αk > 0. Then, Condition (4) implies that in the optimum, αk must be zero
for any k > L∗. Therefore, L∗ is the upper bound for the number of land partition.
It is readily shown that when limα→0+ s′(α) = ∞, partitioning the land into L∗
blocks is the optimum for the landowner and α1, ...,αL∗ are determined to satisfy
s′(α1)µ1 = ...= s′(αL∗)µL∗ and ∑L∗k=1 αk =C.
The models considered in this section are applied to many other examples such
as selling government bonds to securities companies and selling leases of tract for
oil and gas exploitation.
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5 Comparative statics analysis on the optimal number of
slots
In this section, we explore how the optimal number of advertising slots varies with
changes in exogenous conditions. Specifically, we consider the comparative statics
of a change in a distribution function for the bidders’ valuation and a change in the
number of the potential bidders in the market on the optimal number of slots.
5.1 Comparative statics of the change in distribution functions
Let F and G be different distribution functions for the bidders’ values. We first
prepare dominance relations on the set of random variables or the set of distribution
functions. In the following analysis, we use notations X and Y to denote random
variables distributed according to F and G, respectively.
The first one describes a situation where one random variable X is larger than
another random variable Y . We say that F stochastic-dominates (s-dominates) G
and write F =s G if for any u ∈ (0,1), F−1(u)> G−1(u). If F =s G, we say that X
s-dominates Y .
We say that F is the right parallel shift of G if for some c ∈R, F(v) =G(v−c)
for v ∈ [c, v¯).
The next is a variability comparison between two random variables. We say
that F dispersive-dominates (d-dominates) G and write F =d G if F−1(u)−G−1(u)
is non-decreasing in u ∈ (0,1). Then, if F is the right parallel shift of G, both
F =d G and G=d F hold.10
Assume F and G satisfy regularity. Let φF(·) and φG(·) denote the virtual valu-
ations under distribution function F and G, respectively. Thus, φF(v) = v− 1−F(v)f (v)
and φG(v) = v− 1−G(v)g(v) . We say that F virtual valuation-dominates (v-dominates)
G and write F =v G if a random variable φF(X) s-dominates another φG(Y ). Thus,
10For basic results on s-domination and d-domination, refer to Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)
and Boland, Shaked, and Shanthikumar (1998).
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if F =v G, the virtual valuation calculated from distribution function F is stochastic
larger than the virtual valuation calculated from distribution function G.
An important consequence of v-dominance is that F =v G holds if and only if
(1− u)(G−1(u)−F−1(u)) is increasing in u ∈ (0,1). To confirm this, let ΦF(·)
and ΦG(·) be distribution functions of random variables φF(X) and φG(Y ), respec-
tively. Then, by the assumption on the regularity, the inverse function of ΦF(·) is
determined by
Φ−1F (u) = φF(F−1(u)) = F−1(u)−
1−u
f (F−1(u))
for any u∈ (0,1). Differentiating (1−u)(G−1(u)−F−1(u)) by u∈ (0,1), we have
−(G−1(u)−F−1(u))+(1−u)( 1
g(G−1(u))
− 1f (F−1(u)))
=−
(
G−1(u)− 1−u
g(G−1(u))
)
+
(
F−1(u)− 1−uf (F−1(u))
)
=−Φ−1G (u)+Φ−1F (u).
If F =v G, this must be positive because F =v G implies Φ−1F (u)>Φ−1G (u). On the
other hand, if this is positive for any u ∈ (0,1), F =v G holds.11
To avoid confusion, in this section we write µFk (resp. µGk ) instead of µk when
the values of bidders are i.i.d. F (resp. G). Similarly, we denote the optimal number
of slots defined in Proposition 2 by L∗F (resp. L∗G) when the values of bidders are
i.i.d. F (resp. G).
The following theorem shows that the v-dominance is a sufficient condition for
the inequality relationship between µFk and µGk .
Theorem 2. Let F and G be two different distribution functions for the bidders’
valuations and satisfy regularity. If F v-dominates G, then
µFk > µGk
holds for any k 5 K.
11Following Bulow and Roberts (1989), for q ∈ (0,1), the virtual valuation φF (F−1(1− q)) is
interpreted as the marginal revenue of the discriminating monopolist when he sells q unit of goods.
Then, since F =v G is equivalent to Φ−1F (u) > Φ−1G (u) for any u ∈ (0,1), it is equivalent to the
condition that the marginal revenue under F is greater than that under G.
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The proof is in the appendix.
From this theorem, we know that if F =v G, for any k, the marginal expected
return of slot k when the bidder’s values are distributed according to F is greater
than that when the bidder’s values are distributed according to G.
Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we obtain the result on the comparative statics
of the optimal number of advertising slots.
Corollary 1. Let F and G be two different distribution functions for the bidders’
valuations. If both F and G are regular and F v-dominates G, L∗F = L∗G.
Thus, the v-dominance is a sufficient condition for the inequality relationship
between the optimal number of advertising slots under different distribution func-
tions. As applications of this corollary, we list the following two propositions.
Proposition 4. Assume that F and G are regular. If F is the right parallel shift of
G, then L∗F = L∗G.
Proof. From the definition of the right parallel shift, there exists c > 0 such that
F(v)=G(v−c) for any v∈ [c, v¯). This implies that f (v)= g(v−c) for any v∈ [c, v¯)
and F−1(u)− c = G−1(u) hold for any u ∈ (0,1). Then,
−
(
G−1(u)− 1−u
g(G−1(u))
)
+
(
F−1(u)− 1−uf (F−1(u))
)
= c > 0.
Thus F =v G, and from Corollary 1, L∗F = L∗G.
This proposition implies that if the values of the bidders are uniformly in-
creased by some positive constant, the optimal number of slots is increasing or
unchanged.
Proposition 5. Assume that F and G are regular. If F =s G and G =d F, then
L∗F = L∗G.
Proof. By the definitions of the s-dominance and d-dominance, (G−1(u)−F−1(u))
is a negative and increasing function in u∈ (0,1). Thus, (1−u)(G−1(u)−F−1(u))
is an increasing function; therefore, F =v G. From Corollary 1, L∗F = L∗G.
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This proposition states that if F is larger (in a stochastic sense) than G and is
less scattered (in a stochastic sense) than G, the optimal number of slots under F is
greater than or equal to that under G.
How can we interpret these propositions on the optimal number of slots? The
answer seems to come from the following two intuitive statements: keeping other
conditions constant,
(1) when large bidder’s values are more realized, the seller can increase its revenue
by supplying more advertising slots, and
(2) when values of bidders are less scattered, the seller can increase its revenue by
supplying more advertising slots.
We explain why these two statements hold. For the first statement, there is
a simple reason. When the higher values of the bidders are likely to be realized,
the cost of deleting advertising slots becomes expensive. Thus, if the values of
the bidders are expected to be high, the search engine can increase the revenue by
providing more slots.
Next, we explain the second statement. When the valuations of the advertisers
are less scattered, each bidder has a chance to obtain a higher advertising slot by
slightly increasing his bid, and this leads to higher bids by advertisers in equilib-
rium. This results in higher revenue for the auctioneer. In this case, the auctioneer
has a weak incentive to decrease the number of slots. On the other hand, when the
valuations of the advertisers are more scattered, each bidder cannot obtain a higher
advertising slot by a small increase in his bid, and this leads to lower bids by ad-
vertisers in equilibrium. This results in less revenue for the auctioneer. In such a
case, the auctioneer has a strong incentive to decrease the number of slots in order
to make the bids of advertisers higher.
To check these statements, we consider a general uniform distribution on [a,b]
where a= 0 and b > a. The expectation of k-th highest order statistic is given by
E[V(k)] = (b−a)
n+1− k
n+1
+a.
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Thus, by a simple calculation, the marginal return of slot k is
µk =
2(b−a)
n+1
(
b(n+1)
2(b−a) − k
)
.
From this, the optimal number of slots is b b2(b−a)(n+1)c if b b2(b−a)(n+1)c5 n−1
and the optimal number is n− 1 otherwise.12 Statement (1) holds in this case
because if b increases with keeping (b− a) a constant value, the optimal num-
ber increases or is unchanged. In addition, Statement (2) holds because if (b−a)
decreases with keeping b a constant value, the optimal number increases or is un-
changed.
From a general uniform distribution, we can provide examples of why both s-
dominance and d-dominance are needed in Proposition 5. Let F and G be uniform
distributions on [1,10] and [1,3], respectively. Then, F =s G holds but G =d F
does not. From the result in the previous paragraph, L∗F is b59(n+ 1)c and L∗G is
b34(n+1)c. Thus, we have L∗F < L∗G. Next, let F and G be uniform distributions
on [1,3] and [3,7], respectively. Then, G =d F holds but F =s G does not. Then,
L∗F is b34(n+1)c and L∗G is b78(n+1)c. Thus, we have L∗F < L∗G.
5.2 Comparative statics analysis of the change in the number of the
bidders
In this subsection, we explore how the optimal number of slots changes due to a
change in the number of the bidders in the market. We denote by µFk:n the marginal
return of slot k and by LF∗n the optimal number of slots defined in Proposition 2
when there are n bidders whose values are i.i.d. F . We obtain the following result.
Theorem 3. Assume that F is regular. Then,
µFk:n+1 > µFk:n
holds for any k 5 K.
12For x ∈ R, bxc denotes the maximal integer that is less than or equal to x.
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The proof is in the appendix.
From this theorem, we obtain a natural result on the optimal numbers of slots
for the markets with different depths.
Corollary 2. Assume that F satisfies regularity. Then, LF∗n+1 = LF∗n .
From this corollary, we find that the optimal number of slots increases as the
number of potential advertisers increases.
6 Concluding remarks
In this study, we explored the optimal number of the advertising slots that maxi-
mizes the auctioneer’s revenue. Our result showed that the auctioneer indeed has
an incentive to delete certain lower advertising slots. In reality, the search engines
like Google and Yahoo! restrict the number of the advertising slots for each search
result page, and this is well explained by our analysis. In the real world keyword
auction, a reserve price is a familiar and convenient way to increase the seller’s rev-
enue. However, in the recent change in the rule of of Google (AdWords) keyword
auctions, AdWords removed the reserve price, called a “minimum bids.” Instead,
it began to present the information on “first page bid estimates,” which is an es-
timated value of a bid needed for the ad to be displayed on the first search result
page.13 This may be the evidence for the importance of a slot-restriction in the first
result page as a revenue improving mechanism of a search engine. The analysis
should be expanded to explore the difference between setting the reserve price and
restricting the number of slots as slot supply strategy of a search engine.
13See, http://adwords.blogspot.com/2008/09/quality-score-improvements-to-go-live.
html, last checked May 29, 2010.
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Appendix
From the theory of order statistic, it is known that
E[V(k)] =
∫ v¯
0
x
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)! f (x)F(x)
n−k(1−F(x))k−1dx.
Put u = F(x). Then, x = F−1(u) and du = f (x)dx. Thus, we obtain
E[V(k)] =
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!u
n−k(1−u)k−1du. (5)
From this, we can calculate µk as follows. For all k = 1,2, . . . ,n−1,
µk =−(k−1)E[V(k)]+ kE[V(k+1)]
=−(k−1)
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!u
n−k(1−u)k−1du
+ k
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
n!
(n− k−1)!k!u
n−k−1(1−u)kdu
=
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
(6)
For k = n,
µn =−(n−1)E[V(n)] =−n(n−1)
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)(1−u)n−1du (7)
From (6) and (7), for all k = 1,2, . . . ,n,
µk =
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
(8)
Proof of Theorem 1
(i). From (8), for k = 1,2, ...,n−1,
µk−µk+1
=
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
− n!
(n− k−1)!k!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n− k−1)un−k−2(1−u)k+1− kun−k−1(1−u)k
]
du
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=
n!
(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)un−k−2(1−u)k−2
[
k(n− k)u(1−u)− k(k−1)u2
− (n− k)(n− k−1)(1−u)2+ k(n− k)u(1−u)
]
du
=
n!
(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)un−k−2(1−u)k−2
[
(n− k−1)(ku− (n− k)(1−u))(1−u)
− (k−1)u(ku− (n− k)(1−u))+nu(1−u)
]
du
=
n!
(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
(1−u)F−1(u) ddu
[
un−k−1(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k)(1−u))
]
du
=
n!
(n− k)!k!
{ [
(1−u)F−1(u)un−k−1(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k)(1−u))
]1
0
+
∫ 1
0
(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
un−k−1(1−u)k−1 (ku− (n− k)(1−u))du
}
.
(9)
Note that
[
(1−u)F−1(u)un−k−1(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k)(1−u))
]1
0
=

0 if k < n−1,
F−1(0)≥ 0 if k = n−1.
(10)
From (9) and (10),
µk−µk+1 ≥ n!(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
un−k−1(1−u)k−1 (ku− (n− k)(1−u))du. (11)
Note that∫ 1
0
un−k−1(1−u)k−1 (ku− (n− k)(1−u))du =
[
−un−k(1−u)k
]1
0
= 0. (12)
From (11) and (12),
µk−µk+1 ≥ n!(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
[(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
−
(
F−1(r)− (1− r)f−1(r)
)]
un−k−1(1−u)k−1 (ku− (n− k)(1−u))du (13)
where r = n−k
n
. Note that
un−k−1(1−u)k−1 (ku− (n− k)(1−u))

< 0 if 0 < u < r,
> 0 if r < u < 1.
(14)
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Furthermore, since by regularity, F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u) is increasing in u,14
(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
−
(
F−1(r)− (1− r)f−1(r)
)
< 0 if 0 < u < r,
> 0 if r < u < 1.
(15)
From (13), (14), and (15), it follows that µk−µk+1 > 0.
(ii). From (8),
µ1 = n
∫ 1
0
F−1(u) [(n−1)un(1−u)]du > 0.
(iii). It is obvious from (7).
Proof of Theorem 2
From (8),
µFk −µGk
=
n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
− n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
G−1(u)
[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
=
n!
(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
(1−u)(F−1(u)−G−1(u))[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k−1− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−2
]
du
(16)
Note that∫ 1
0
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k−1− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−2du =
[
un−k(1−u)k−1
]1
0
= 0.
(17)
14This is checked as follows. Let ϕ(u) = φF (F−1(u)) for u ∈ (0,1). Then,
dϕ
du =
dφF
dv (F
−1(u))
dF−1
du (u) =
dφF
dv (F
−1(u))
1
f (F−1(u)) .
Since the regularity implies dφFdv (F
−1(u))> 0, we have dϕdu > 0.
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From (16) and (17),
µFk −µGk =
n!
(n− k)!k!
∫ 1
0
[
(1−u)(F−1(u)−G−1(u))− (1− r)(F−1(r)−G−1(r))][
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k−1− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−2
]
du (18)
where r = n−k
n−1 . Note that
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k−1− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−2

> 0 if 0 < u < r,
< 0 if r < u < 1.
(19)
Since F v-dominates G, (1−u)(F−1(u)−G−1(u)) is decreasing in u. Thus,
(1−u)(F−1(u)−G−1(u))− (1− r)(F−1(r)−G−1(r))

> 0 if 0 < u < r
< 0 if r < u < 1.
(20)
From (18), (19), and (20), it follows that µFk −µGk > 0.
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Proof of Theorem 3
From (8),
µFk:n+1−µFk:n
=
(n+1)!
(n− k+1)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n+1− k)un−k(1−u)k− (k−1)un+1−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
− n!
(n− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)
[
(n− k)un−k−1(1−u)k− (k−1)un−k(1−u)k−1
]
du
=
n!
(n− k+1)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)un−k−1(1−u)k−1
[
(n+1)(n− k+1)u(1−u)
− (n+1)(k−1)u2− (n− k+1)(n− k)(1−u)+(n− k+1)(k−1)u
]
du
=
n!
(n− k+1)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)un−k−1(1−u)k−1
[
(n− k)(1−u)(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))
− (k−1)u(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))+(n+1)u(1−u)
]
du
=
n!
(n+1− k)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
(1−u)F−1(u) ddu
[
un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))
]
du.
=
n!
(n− k+1)!(k−1)!
{ [
(1−u)F−1(u)un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))
]1
0
+
∫ 1
0
(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))du
}
.
(21)
Note that
[
(1−u)F−1(u)un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))
]1
0
=

0 if k < n,
F−1(0)≥ 0 if k = n.
(22)
From (21) and (22),
µFk:n+1−µFk:n ≥
n!
(n− k+1)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
un−k(1−u)k−1 (ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))du. (23)
Note that∫ 1
0
un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))du =
[
−un−k+1(1−u)k
]1
0
= 0. (24)
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From (23) and (24),
µFk:n+1−µFk:n≥
n!
(n− k+1)!(k−1)!
∫ 1
0
[(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
−
(
F−1(r)− (1− r)f−1(r)
)]
un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))du (25)
where r = n−k+1
n+1 . Note that
un−k(1−u)k−1(ku− (n− k+1)(1−u))

< 0 if 0 < u < r,
> 0 if r < u < 1.
(26)
Furthermore, since by regularity, F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u) is increasing in u,
(
F−1(u)− (1−u)f−1(u)
)
−
(
F−1(r)− (1− r)f−1(r)
)
< 0 if 0 < u < r,
> 0 if r < u < 1.
(27)
From (25), (26), and (27), it follows that µFk:n+1−µFk:n > 0.
